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Abstract 
The debate on trade and poverty is reinforced by recent studies on the role of standards. It is argued 
that increasing standards act as trade barriers for developing countries and cause further 
marginalization of the poor. This paper is the first to quantify income and poverty effects of such 
high-standards trade and to integrate labor market effects, by using company and household survey 
data from the vegetable export chain in Senegal. We find that exports have grown sharply despite 
increasing standards, resulting in important income gains and poverty reduction. Our estimates 
indicate that poverty is 14 % points lower due to vegetable exports. Tightening food standards 
induced a shift from smallholder contract-based farming to large-scale integrated estate production, 
altering the mechanism through which poor households benefit: through labor markets instead of 
product markets. The impact on poverty reduction is stronger as the poorest benefit relatively more 
from working on large-scale farms than from contract farming. 
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  11. Introduction  
The integration of developing countries in global trade is generally believed to stimulate economic 
growth in those countries (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Irwin and Tervio, 2002; Frankel and Romer, 
1999).
1 However, there is much less consensus about the impact of trade on poverty. While some 
advocate participation in international trade as a major potential engine for global poverty reduction 
(Aksoy and Beghin, 2005; Anderson and Martin, 2005; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002; Dollar and 
Kraay, 2004), in a broad survey of the evidence, Winters et al (2004, pp.106) conclude that “there 
can be no simple general conclusion about the relationship between trade liberalization and 
poverty”.     
The recent debate on standards and development casts further doubt on the beneficial effect 
of trade liberalization. The first critique is that the proliferation and tightening of quality and safety 
standards in high-income markets is causing new (non-tariff) barriers for developing country exports 
(Augier et al., 2005; Brenton and Manchin, 2002; Unnevehr, 2000). The second critique is that 
increasing standards result in the marginalization of small businesses and poor farm-households in 
developing countries as they are excluded from high-standards supply chains while the rents in the 
chain are extracted by large (often multinational) companies and developing country elites (Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al., 1999).  
However, there is considerable debate and uncertainty on the validity of these arguments, 
and more generally on the welfare implications of high-standards trade (Swinnen, 2007). Empirical 
studies have often focused on the question of small farmers’ participation in high-standards food 
supply chains and have come to diverse conclusions.
2  However, there is a more fundamental 
problem with this literature on standards, trade and poverty. None of these studies actually measures 
                                                 
1  See Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for a critique on this conclusion and Winters et al (2004) for a survey of 
the arguments.  
2  Many studies indicate that small farmers are excluded because of increasing food standards (Reardon et al., 
2003; Key and Runsten, 1999; Gibbon, 2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Kherralah, 2000). Evidence 
from Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire e.g. suggests that horticulture exports are increasingly grown on 
large industrial estate farms, thereby excluding smallholder suppliers in the export supply chain (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Minot and Ngigi, 2004). Others find very different effects. For example, Minten et al. (2007) 
show that in Madagascar most FFV export production is on very small farms, often on a contract-basis with 
the agro-food industry, and with important positive effects on farmers’ productivity. Similar results are found 
by studies in Asia (Gulati et al. 2006) and in Eastern Europe (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
  2welfare and poverty effects and most studies ignore labor market effects, which are possibly 
extremely important in this debate.   
The aim of this study is to contribute to both the literature on standards and development 
and the more general literature on trade and poverty by assessing the welfare and poverty 
implications of increasing standards on fruit and vegetable (FFV
3) exports in Senegal. We first 
analyze how the structure of the FFV export supply chain in Senegal has changed in response to 
tightening food standards and then investigate how this has affected welfare of poor households. Our 
study uses household level data to assess the poverty effects of FFV trade. In doing so, we attempt to 
contribute to filling the empirical gap identified by Winters et al (2004, pp.107) who conclude that 
“there is relatively little empirical evidence about the effects of trade … on poverty dynamics at the 
household level, and on how households respond to … potential opportunities”. Our approach is also 
in line with Srinivasan and Bhagwati’s (2001) argument that more convincing evidence may be 
derived from country case studies than from cross-country regressions.   
High-standards FFV exports from Senegal is a particularly relevant case for a number of 
reasons. First, Sub Sahara Africa is the region generally considered most lagging in global market 
integration and poverty reduction. Second, FFV is one of the most dynamic export sectors, 
especially for developing countries where they have grown importantly in recent years – from 14% 
of total food exports in 1980 to 22% in 2000 (Aksoy, 2005). Given the intensity of land and 
unskilled labor in this sector, the longer cultivation periods in tropical countries, and export 
incentives such as preferential trade agreements, developing countries have been able to capture a 
significantly increased share of world FFV trade (Diop and Jaffee, 2005). Third, FFV exports are 
increasingly confronted with tightening food standards – arising from public legislation as well as 
from private multinational companies who increasingly dominate world trade (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2007; Reardon and Berdegué, 2002).  
To measure the poverty and welfare impacts of high-standards horticulture exports in 
Senegal, we collected data at three different levels. First, we collected statistics on horticulture 
                                                 
3 The term FFV, standing for “fresh and processed fruits and vegetables”, is used throughout the paper. The 
term was defined by Diop and Jaffee (2005, pp. 237) to comprise all SITC (Standard International Trade 
Classification) Revision 1, Chapter 5 items except nuts, roots, and tubers.  
   
  3production and exports from existing data sources and conducted a series of qualitative expert 
interviews. Second, in April 2005, we conducted quantitative and structured interviews with nine of 
the 20 horticulture exporting companies in the Dakar region. Third, in the period August-September 
2005, we organized a large survey among farm-households in the main horticulture zone Les Niayes 
from where the large majority of export produce originates.    
Our study yields several important findings. First, we find that FFV exports from Senegal to 
the EU have increased sharply over the past decade, despite increasing food standards in the EU. 
Second, these FFV exports contribute to poor household incomes in the FFV producing regions. 
Third, tightening food standards induced structural changes in the supply chain, including a shift 
from smallholder contract-based farming to large-scale integrated estate production. Fourth, despite 
these changes, the welfare implications of high-standards FFV export production for rural 
households are found to remain strongly positive. Supply chain restructuring has altered the 
mechanism through which local households benefit: increasingly through labor markets instead of 
through product markets. Fifth, this induced change in the mechanism of income gains guarantees an 
equitable distribution of the gains within rural communities as the poorest benefit relatively more 
from working on large-scale farms than from contract farming.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe FFV exports from 
Senegal and the increasing EU standards. Section three deals with standards-induced structural 
changes in the export supply chain. We look at household participation in the chain and overall 
welfare implications of this participation – in terms of income and poverty – in section four. A 
comprehensive econometric analysis of the income and poverty effects is presented in section five 
and six. In a final section, we present the main conclusions and implications.  
 
2. Horticulture exports from Senegal  
  2.1. Increasing exports  
  The horticulture sector plays a central role in Senegal’s export diversification strategy 
towards high-value commodities. FFV exports increased sharply over the past 15 years: from 2,700 
ton in 1991 to 16,000 ton in 2005 (figure 1). The period of the sharpest growth was after 1997 when 
the export of French beans alone increased from 3,000 ton to almost 7,000 ton. French beans 
  4represent almost half (42%) of the total FFV export volume aside from other major crops including 
cherry tomatoes (23%) and mangoes (16%).    
  Apart from some small volumes exported to neighboring countries, FFV are exported to the 
EU; in particular to France (40%), the Netherlands (35%) and Belgium (16%). Senegal ranks fourth 
as external supplier of beans to the EU, after Morocco, Egypt en Kenya (Eurostat, 2006).  
 
  2.2. Increasing standards 
The FFV sector in Senegal experienced accelerated export growth during a period when 
food standards increased substantially. FFV exports to the EU now have to satisfy a series of 
stringent public and private quality and safety standards. EU legislation imposes (1) common 
marketing standards for FFV
4; (2) sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures; (3) general hygiene 
rules based on HACCP control mechanisms; and (4) traceability standards. The latter two 
requirements came into force with the General Food Law of 2002. Traceability implies that EU food 
companies have to document from/to whom they are buying/selling produce such that products can 
be traced back to their origin in case of food safety problems. Also SPS measures became much 
more stringent; e.g. decreasing tolerance for chemical residue levels
5, treatment of wooden 
packaging material (since 2005) and maximum levels of contamination by heavy metals (since 
2002).  
Moreover, in addition to increasing public standards, many large trading and retailing 
companies have engaged in establishing private food standards that are even stricter. For example, 
the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (Eurep) has engaged in adapting food quality and safety 
standards into the EurepGAP certification protocol. On top of public traceability regulations that 
apply within the EU, they require complete traceability throughout the chain up to the level of 
overseas producers. Agri-food businesses in the EU increasingly require such private certification 
from their suppliers.   
                                                 
4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 912/2001, an amendment of EC No 2000/96, specifies a classification for 
French beans based on quality and size, and stipulates provisions concerning the presentation and marketing of 
the beans.   
5 Since 2000 there have been 29 new EU notifications of maximum residue levels (MRL) to the WTO (World 
Trade Organization, 2006).  
  5Despite these increasing standards, Senegal has been able to increase horticulture export 
earnings – as was also the case for e.g. Kenya (Jaffee, 2003). This proves that tightening standards 
do not necessarily undermine the competitive position of developing countries in international 
agricultural markets. The World Bank (2004) argues that the development of a certification scheme 
and validation of the label Origine Sénégal has played an essential role in raising the quality and 
standards of Senegalese FFV, and thereby realizing export growth.   
 
3. Structural changes in the export supply chain 
Changes in EU standards put pressure on FFV exporters in Senegal to stay up to date with the 
changing requirements and to make additional investments for compliance. The growing demands 
also increase the need for tighter coordination and have led to important structural changes in the 
FFV export supply chain in Senegal, with major implications for Senegalese farmers. Key structural 
changes are (1) increased consolidation at the level of the agro-exporting industry as well as at the 
level of the primary producers; and (2) increased vertical coordination with downstream buyers in 
the EU as well as with upstream suppliers. This translates into a decreasing volume of French beans 
that is procured from small farmers and an increase in vertically integrated FFV estate production. 
We document and analyze these structural changes in more detail with information from 
quantitative interviews with nine of the 20 horticulture exporting companies in the Dakar region. 
Our company sample constitutes a mixture of firms recently entering the market and older firms, a 
mixture of smaller and larger exporter, and a mixture of domestic and foreign companies, jointly 
representing 44% of the exported volume French beans (table 1). 
 
  3.1. Increased consolidation 
  Because of financial constraints, only larger firms are able to comply with increasingly 
stringent food standards. Since 1994, most exporters are member of the organization SEPAS
6 which 
coordinates transport, provides market information and assists its members in the contact with 
overseas buyers. However, following the increasing EU standards, the seven largest FFV exporters 
                                                 
6 Syndicat des Exportateurs des Produits Agricoles 
  6founded the organization ONAPES
7 in 1999. One of their specific aims was to comply with 
traceability standards and become EurepGAP certified. Four ONAPES companies are in our sample 
(table 2) among which one is EurepGAP and HACCP certified (since 2004). Three other firms are in 
the process of certification and made substantial investments for this in the past couple of years. The 
remaining exporters, mainly smaller ones, are not certified and not undertaking particular 
investments in the scope of certification.   
As a result, since 2000, the export sector is consolidating with mainly smaller exporters 
dropping out. While the number of French bean exporting companies dropped from 27 to 20 firms in 
the past three years, the market share of the three largest companies increased from less than half in 
2002 to two-thirds in 2005.  
 
3.2. Increased vertical coordination  
Vertical coordination increased, both downstream and upstream. First, FFV exporters – 
especially larger firms – increasingly engage in tighter coordination with downstream importers and 
wholesalers in the EU market. Smaller exporters deal with importers through non-binding indicative 
agreements on the supplied quantity. Larger exporters have recently changed to more binding 
contracts with overseas buyers; including price, quantity and timing of delivery, and sometimes also 
pre-financing. Exporters mention the volatility of EU market prices and the incidence of produce 
refusal by importers to be the main reasons to engage in tighter coordination.  
Second, to guarantee product quality, food safety, and traceability throughout the supply 
chain and to assure accurate timing of production and harvesting exporters – especially larger firms 
– increasingly rely on tighter vertical coordination with upstream suppliers of primary produce. This 
occurs in two ways. The first is through more elaborate production contracts and tighter coordination 
within those contracts. Contracts signed with small family farms are typically specified for one 
season – lasting from November till April – and indicate the area to be planted – usually 0.5 or 1 ha 
– all technical requirements and the price. As part of the contract, the firms provide technical 
assistance and inputs to the farmers; especially seeds and chemicals, sometimes also cash credit. 
Some firms go as far in contract-coordination as the complete management of fertilizer and pesticide 
                                                 
7 Organisation National des Producteurs Exportateurs de Fruits et Légumes de Sénégal 
  7application and daily or weekly inspection of the farmers’ fields. Also field preparation, planting 
and/or harvesting can be coordinated and financed completely by the contractor firm. Especially 
larger exporters provide pre-financing and apply tighter contract-coordination while smaller 
exporters leave management decisions to the farmers.  
A second, and even more radical, change towards vertical coordination is the shift from 
smallholder contract-based farming to large-scale estate production. Larger exporters are 
increasingly engaging in fully integrated estate production. In fact, the ONAPES exporting 
companies have agreed among themselves that each member should seek to process every season a 
volume of at least 200 ton of which at least  50% should originate from the companies own estate 
production – a measure that is having a profound impact on the structure of the export supply chain. 
Three firms in our sample have already substantially reduced procurement through smallholder 
contract-farming: from 100% in their first year of operation to respectively 60% and 20% in the last 
season (table 2). These companies cited quality rather than quantity to be the reason for this change. 
Also other firms in the sample mentioned fully integrated production to be an important strategy for 
compliance with food standards in the future and hence for the survival and growth of the firm. 
Similar observations of standards-induced consolidations and vertical coordination – 
including a shift towards large-scale estate farming – have been noticed in the FFV export sector of 
other African countries; e.g. in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; 
Minot and Ngigi, 2004). It is generally argued that this leads to the marginalization of small farmers. 
In the next sections we will provide evidence that this has not been the case in Senegal.         
 
4. Household participation and welfare in FFV export production  
  4.1. Survey and data  
To measure the effects of FFV exports for local households, we organized in August – 
September 2005 a large household survey in the main horticulture zone Les Niayes – from where 
over 90% of exported French beans originate (Gergely, 2001). The majority of households in this 
area are smallholder horticulture farmers producing – next to French beans for export – a large 
variety of vegetables and basic food crops for the local market and for direct consumption (Fall and 
Fall, 2000).  
  8We randomly selected 23 villages in three rural communities – Sangalkam, Diender and 
Noto – in the region Dakar and Thiès
8 (figure 2). Within those villages we selected 300 farm-
households to be included in the sample, of which 59 produced French beans on contract with an 
agro-exporting company during the 2005 export season. Due to this selection contracted farmers are 
over-sampled. To draw correct inferences we use sampling weights calculated – with information 
gathered at the village and community level – as the inverse of the probability of contracted and non-
contracted households to be selected in a particular rural community.  
The sample represents small household farms in the area. Among the sampled households, 
agriculture constitutes on average more than 80% of total household income and the average farm 
size is 5 ha. Eighty-eight percent of the sampled households cultivate less than 10 ha – which is in 
the region considered as the threshold to be classified as a smallholder (Fall and Fall, 2000). 
 
4.2. Household participation 
  Along with increasing exports also the participation of rural Senegalese households in high-
standards horticulture export production increased dramatically over the past 15 years: from less 
than 10% in 1991 to 40% in 2005 (figure 3). However, as a result of standards-induced structural 
changes in the supply chain the nature of increased household participation differed strongly in the 
1990s from more recent years. During the 1990s households increasingly took part in export 
production through contract farming. By 2000 an estimated 23% of households in the research area 
were contracted to produce beans for export. However, from 2000 onwards, the incidence of contract 
farming decreased – from 23% in 2000 to 10% in 2005 – while that of wage employment on estate 
farms increased sharply – from less than 10% of households in 2000 to 34% in 2005. As a result of 
the supply chain restructuring in the period 2000-2005, 72% of contracted farmers lost their French 
bean contract. Almost half of them (43%) started to work on estate farms. The exporting firms that 
dissolved the contracts either exited the market or started their own estate production.  
                                                 
8 This area was selected for the research as these communities are strongly influenced by the horticulture 
export sector. The effects of FFV exports however reach further as also other communities in Les Niayes are 
influenced and as the sector attracts temporary migrant workers. The effect of this can however not be 
measured with our sample design and the derived results are specific for the selected research area.  
  9Still, on aggregate, participation of rural households in high-standards FFV production 
continues to increase with their role shifting from contract farmers to estate farm workers. Based on 
company level data for the 2005 season, we estimate that almost 1,000 farmers produce French 
beans on contract and that FFV exporting companies employ almost 12,000 workers (mostly 
temporarily).
9 The shift from contract farming to estate farming
10 has important implications for the 
distribution of rural incomes, which we analyze in detail in the next sections.  
   .  
4.3. Characteristics of FFV producers     
  The distributional implications of high-standards FFV exports critically depend on the 
participation of poorer households in the supply chain. The figures in table 3 indicate that 
households differ substantially in their access to human, physical and social capital. First, both 
contract farmers and estate farm workers come from households with more laborers and a slightly 
higher education. Participants in estate farm work are slightly older households with more 
dependents. No female-headed households are involved in contract farming. Second, contract 
farmers have on average larger farms – 6.8 ha compared to 4.9 ha for non-participating households – 
and more livestock – 4.1 units compared to 2.9 units. These comparatively larger contracted farms 
are in per capita terms, however, still small with 1 ha of land per capita – compared to 0.83 ha for 
non-participating households. Estate wage workers tend to be households with less land – 0.78 ha 
per capita – less livestock – 1.8 units – and less non-land assets – 176 thousand FCFA compared to 
320 thousand FCFA for other households. Third, among the estate farm workers there are less ethnic 
minority households. More contracted farmers are a member of a farmers’ organization. Fourth, in 
the region Dakar – which is closer to exporting companies and shipping facilities – there are more 
farms involved in FFV export production than in Thiès.   
                                                 
9 It is unclear how many households in total are involved in FFV estate employment (which complicates a 
comparison of these figures with those from the household survey). The 12,000 workers might include several 
members of the same households and might include temporary migrants from outside the research area.  
10 It is important to note that the shifting role of households in the export supply chain should not be perceived 
as an absolute change in household status from independent farmers to subordinate workers. French bean 
export production is concentrated in one season (from November till April – which does not coincide with the 
main ‘rainy’ agricultural season) and households generally allocate only a share of their land and/or labor to 
these activities – either as contract farmer or as estate farm worker – thereby continuing to primarily be 
independent smallholders. Moreover, the expansion of the estate sector does not come at the expense of the 
smallholder farming operations. Companies seeking to expand estate production either buy or rent land from 
large commercial farms (usually over 100 ha), integrate with these farms or invest in uncultivated land 
belonging to the government 
  104.4 Income and poverty
11  
The participation of rural households in the supply chain of high-standards FFV exports is 
associated with sharp welfare differences. A simple comparison of means reveals large differences 
in household income: 1.8 million FCFA for non-participating households compared to 4.5 million 
and 6.4 million for FFV estate workers and FFV contract farmers respectively (figure 4). These 
differences in income remain large in per capita terms: the average per capita income
12 for estate 
wage workers is 552,000 FCFA and for contract farmers 924,000 FCFA, which is respectively 
double and more than triple the per capita income of non-participating households (266,000 FCFA). 
On average, agriculture is the main source of income in the area and two thirds of household income 
is derived from own farming (figure 4). Yet, estate farm workers derive more than one third of their 
income from agricultural wages – mainly (more then 80 %) earned at vegetable estate farms – while 
still having farm incomes that are higher than non-participating households.  
The incidence of poverty in the research area is estimated to be 42 % – which is 
considerably lower than the national rural poverty rate of 58 %. Poverty is much higher among 
households who do not participate in export production (47%) than among households employed in 
FFV estates (40%) and especially among FFV contract farmers (13%) (figure 5). The incidence of 
extreme poverty is 12% in the surveyed region but is much lower among households involved in 
FFV export production – 5% among FFV estate workers and 2% among FFV contract farmers – then 
among non-participating households (17%).   
In conclusion, both relatively larger farms or better-off households, and poorer households 
participate in high-standards vegetable production but the former rather as contract farmers and the 
latter as estate employees while both have incomes that are substantially higher than for non-
participating households. These correlations suggest that the current structure of the export supply 
chain with the coexistence of smallholder contract-based production and large-scale estate farming 
                                                 
11 We use the national rural poverty lines that were constructed using data from the ESAM I and II surveys 
conducted in 1994 and 2002 (République du Sénégal, 2004) and adapt them for changes in  consumer price 
indices (African Development Bank, 2006). The poverty lines that are used are 143,080 FCFA/year/adult 
equivalent for poverty and 31,812 FCFA/year/adult equivalent for extreme poverty. As no data are available 
on household expenditures and consumption, we use income data to derive poverty indicators.     
12 Per capita incomes are calculated using the modified OECD adult equivalence scale.  
  11guarantees a more equitable participation in the export supply chain and translates into a more 
equitable distribution of the gains from high-standards exports.  
 
5. Econometric analysis of income effects  
The data and descriptive analysis presented in the previous section show substantial differences in 
income across households. However, based on a simple comparison of means it is impossible to 
identify causality and to satisfactorily attribute these differences to the impact of FFV export 
production. In this section we present a comprehensive econometric analysis to address this 
causality. We first discuss the potential sources of selection bias and present three different methods 
we use to correct for this bias. We then discuss the results and perform some robustness and 
sensitivity checks.  
 
5.1. Selection bias  
There are various potential sources of selection bias that obscure the causal relation because 
participation in FFV export production is likely to be non-random. First, households can decide – 
based on their access to resources and their preferences – to participate and self-select into contract-
farming or into FFV estate employment. Second, exporting companies might select or exclude 
potential employees and potential contractors based on their skills, access to resources, etc. Third, 
there might be some geographic selection because firms face increasing transaction costs in sourcing 
from distant (or isolated) farmers or because workers’ travel costs increase with distance from 
employment location.   
The possibility to correct for selection bias crucially depends on the availability of 
observable covariates that are correlated with selection into contract-farming or estate employment, 
and/or with the outcome variable of interest – household income. Observable characteristics related 
to households’ access to resources (land, capital, labor); their access to information (organization 
membership); their skills and ability (age, education); their preferences (age, ethnicity, demographic 
structure); and geographic location (village, region) are hence potential covariates for selection 
adjustment. Variables that are correlated with selection into contract farming or estate employment 
  12and/or household income, are identified in table 4. To avoid endogeneity problems some potentially 
relevant but likely endogenous covariates (such as livestock holdings and farm assets) are not 
considered while lagged variables – based on recall data – are considered for the covariates land and 
organization membership (table 4).    
 
5.2. Correction for selection bias  
  To correct for potential selection bias we apply regression and matching techniques from the 
average treatment effects literature
13 in estimating the impact of two treatments – participation in 
FFV estate wage employment (W1) and in FFV contract-farming (W2) – on household income (Y). 
We are ultimately interested in estimating the average treatment effects ATE1 and ATE2, with Y1 
and Y2 representing the income with treatment and Y0 the income without treatment: 
ATE1 = E (Y1 –Y0)    for  W1: FFV estate employment     (1)   
ATE2 = E (Y2 –Y0)    for  W2: FFV contract-farming       (2)   
We hypothesize that high-standards FFV exports has positive welfare implications and 
hence expect both ATEs to be significantly positive.  
We are dealing with two treatments W1 and W2  that are not mutually exclusive as 26 
households are involved in both contract farming and estate employment. The literature generally 
deals with describing methods (regression, matching and propensity score methods) for estimating 
the ATE for one single treatment. These methods logically extend for multiple (mutually non-
exclusive) treatments as long as the basic assumptions apply to the vector of treatments (Lechner, 
2000; Wooldridge, 2004) – an issue addressed in the next section.   
In a first model – referred to as regression on covariates – we control for selection bias by 
including a large set of observable covariates (X) as control functions in the regression of W on 
household income. The ATEs can be estimated with OLS as the regression coefficients on W1 and 
W2 (Imbens, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002). We include in X all the covariates identified in table 4 to be 
correlated with selection into treatment and/or household income, including also village dummies. 
                                                 
13 The techniques described in this literature were initially applied to the impact evaluation of job training 
programs but have since known a wide application in the development economics literature.   
  13To account for the fact that the two treatments are mutually non-exclusive, we include the 
interaction term of the two treatments W1W2.  
i i i i i i i X W W W W Y ε β α α α θ + + + + + = 2 1 3 2 2 1 1    (MODEL  I) 
Rather then correcting for a large number of relevant covariates directly
14, adjustments can 
be made based on the propensity score – defined as the conditional probability of receiving treatment 
(Imbens, 2004; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) – a method pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
As we have two different treatments that are not mutually exclusive, we use a bivariate probit model 
to estimate the propensity scores. Covariates that are significantly (at the 5 % level) correlated with 
the treatment indicator and/or the outcome variable are included as explanatory variables (table 5). 
This specification assures that overlap assumptions and balancing properties are satisfied (see 
further).  
In a second model – referred to as regression on the propensity score – we use the estimated 
bivariate probabilities (p) as propensity score (PS) correction functions in the regression of W1, W2, 
and W1W2 on household income. Here again, the ATEs can be estimated using OLS (Imbens, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2002).  
i i i i i i i i i PS PS PS W W W W Y ε φ φ φ α α α θ + + + + + + + = 12 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 1  (MODEL  II) 
with   () X W W p PS | 0 , 1 ˆ 2 1 1 = = = ;   ( ) X W W p PS | 0 , 1 ˆ 1 2 2 = = = ;  
    () X W W p PS | 1 , 1 ˆ 2 1 12 = = =
Thirdly, we estimate the ATEs with a propensity-score matching method. Matching involves 
pairing treatment and comparison units that are similar in terms of their observable characteristics 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Abadie and Imbens, 2002). As the dimensionality of the set of 
potentially relevant observable covariates X is large, matching directly on the covariates is not 
straightforward. Therefore, we match treated and control units according to the estimated propensity 
score and calculate the ATEs as a weighted average of the outcome difference between treated and 
                                                 
14 Regression on covariates might obscure information on the distribution of covariates in the treated and the 
untreated group. Propensity score methods reduce this problem to a single dimension.   
  14matched controls as in Dehejia and Wahba
15 (2002). We use single-nearest-neighbor matching, 
which according to Imbens (2004) leads to the most credible inferences with the least bias. Matching 
is done with replacement as to assure that each treatment unit is matched to the nearest comparison 
unit, which reduces bias (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Moreover, only observations in the common 
support region – where the propensity score of the treated units are not higher than the maximum or 
less than the minimum propensity score of the control units – are used for calculating the ATEs 
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with N the number of treated units, Yj the income of the control unit C(i) that is matched to the 
treated unit i:  j i C j PS PS i C 1 1 1 min ) ( − =
∈
;  j i C j PS PS i C 2 2 2 min ) ( − =
∈
 and with 
;   () X W W p PS | 0 , 1 ˆ 2 1 1 = = = ( ) X W p PS | 1 ˆ 2 2 = = .  
To deal with the two mutually non-exclusive treatments in this matching method we define 
the treatment group N1 (83) as households only participating in FFV estate employment; the 
treatment group N2 (59) as households participating in FFV contract farming; and the control group 
C (159) as those households not participating in export production. Matching between treated and 
controls is done on the propensity scores estimated with the bivariate probit model specified above 
as the bivariate probability in case of W1 and the marginal probability in case of W2.   
 
5.3. Results and discussion  
The estimation results are presented in tables 5 and 6 and tables A1 - A.2 in appendix. The 
main results, i.e. the estimated treatment effects, are presented in table 6. The results of the bivariate 
probit model estimating the propensity scores used in models II and III are presented in table 5. The 
estimated coefficients of the covariates in the full structural regression models I and II have the 
expected sign and are presented in appendix tables A.1 and A.2.  
                                                 
15 The propensity score matching method discussed and applied by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) differs from 
earlier methods in that unmatched control units are discarded and not directly used in estimating the ATE. This 
avoids extrapolating or smoothing across the treatment and comparison groups.  
  15The applied regression, matching and propensity score methods yield qualitatively identical 
and quantitatively similar estimations of the treatment effects – which indicates that the estimated 
effects are robust to changes in the econometric approach. There are three main results. First, the 
estimated effects for both treatments – FFV estate employment and FFV contract farming – are 
significantly (at the 1% level) positive. This confirms our hypothesis that participation in FFV export 
production, whether through contract farming or through estate employment, has positive effects on 
rural incomes. After correction for potential selection bias (and taking the most conservative among 
the three estimators) we estimate that FFV estate employment increased household income with 1.9 
million FCFA and FFV contract farming with about 4 million FCFA. So, participants in FFV export 
production have incomes that are 60% to 130% higher than the average income in the research area 
– indicating very strong positive effects.  
Second, our estimations indicate that the impact on household income from FFV contract 
farming is about two times higher than the impact from FFV estate employment. For both regression 
models (model I and II), equality of the coefficients on W1 and W2 is rejected at the 10% 
significance level while the hypothesis that the coefficient on W2 is double that of W1 cannot be 
rejected
16.  
Third, the results of the bivariate probit model (table 5) confirm that FFV contract farming is 
biased towards households with initially larger farms while FFV estate employment is not. Every 
additional hectare of initial (1995) landholdings increases the likelihood of a household having a 
contract for FFV export production with 3.5%. There is no significant effect of initial landholdings 
on the probability of being a FFV estate worker which indicates that also the smallest farmers 
participate in estate employment. The results further indicate that larger households with more labor 
endowments and households in the Dakar region – closer to exporting companies – are more likely 
to be involved in FFV contract farming and/or FFV estate employment. Also ethnicity and 
membership of a farmers’ organization influence selection into FFV estate employment.     
   
                                                 
16 An adjusted Wald test for equality of the coefficients on W1 and W2 yields F-values of  F(1, 297) = 2.77 in 
model I and F(1, 297) = 4.16 in model II – both rejecting the hypothesis that those coefficients are equal at the 
10% significance level. An adjusted Wald test for the hypothesis W2=2W1 yields F-values of  F(1, 297) = 0.01 
in model I and F(1, 297) = 0.07 in model II – both not rejecting the hypothesis at the 1% significance level. 
  16  5.4. Assessing the assumptions  
The applied regression and matching methods can yield unbiased estimates of the income 
effect of FFV contract-farming and FFV estate employment subject to two main assumptions 
(Deheija and Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002). The first assumption – referred to as 
conditional independence
17 (CI) – denotes that, conditional upon observable covariates, the receipt 
of treatment is independent of the potential outcomes with and without treatment (Imbens, 2004). 
Hence, participation in FFV contract-farming and/or FFV estate employment cannot depend on 
unobservable characteristics that are arbitrarily correlated with household income
18. This assumption 
is not directly testable
19 (Imbens, 2004) but Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) proposed a method 
for addressing robustness of matching estimators to failure of the CI assumption. The method 
simulates a binary confounder in the data that is used as additional matching factor
20. We use the 
method with a neutral confounder and with confounders calibrated to mimic observable binary 
covariates as in Ichino et al. (2006). The results (table 7) show that the estimators with binary 
confounder differ less than 5% from the baseline matching estimator for treatment 1 and less than 
10% for treatment 2. This is an indication of the robustness of the ATE estimates and the validity of 
the CI assumption.      
The second key assumption in estimating ATE requires sufficient overlap and balancing in 
the covariate distribution between treated and untreated observations (Imbens, 2004). If participating 
and non-participating households differ substantially in observable characteristics, the ATE is 
difficult to estimate – whether using regression, matching or propensity score methods (Imbens, 
2004). Figure 6 compares the distribution of the propensity scores between treated and untreated 
                                                 
17 Different versions of this assumptions are referred to as unconfoundedness, selection on observables, 
ignorability of treatment, or conditional independence (Imbens, 2004; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Lechner, 
1999).  
18 This is a strong assumption and, in general, the plausibility of this assumption in an economic setting has 
been questioned. Optimizing behaviour would preclude choices being independent of potential outcomes. 
Imbens (2004) however provides some basic arguments for using the assumption and the econometric 
techniques relying on the assumption in economic settings.   
19 The conditional independence assumption is intrinsically non-testable because the data are completely 
uninformative about the distribution of the untreated outcome for treated units and vice versa (Imbens, 2004; 
Ichino et al., 2006).    
20 The central presumption in this method is that the assignment to treatment is not independent given a set of 
covariates X but that the CI does hold given X and an unobserved binary covariate (see Ichino et al. (2006) for 
more details). In our setting the unobserved binary covariate could e.g. measure some unobservable component 
of ability that simultaneously influences participation in FFV contract farming and/or FFV estate employment, 
and household income.   
  17(control) observations for both treatments. The estimated propensity scores are strictly between 0 
and 1 – which is a first requirement (Imbens, 2004) – and show distributions with sufficient overlap 
between treated and control units and with a sufficiently large region of common support – where 
the propensity score of the treated units are not higher than the maximum or less than the minimum 
propensity score of the control units. Moreover, we address balancing properties by testing for 
equality of means between treated and (matched) control units for all relevant covariates. The results 
of this test (table 8) show that there is a strong bias for most covariates but that matching eliminates 
this bias such that there is a good balance in covariate distribution between treated and matched 
control units (for both treatments).      
 
  5.5. Sensitivity to the choice of covariates    
The literature on ATE and propensity score methods emphasizes the importance of 
including a “proper” set of covariates (e.g. Imbens, 2004; Dehija and Wahba, 2002; Becker and 
Ichino, 2002). The results of ATE estimations may be sensitive to different specifications of 
conditioning variables but little is known about strategic covariate choice (Imbens, 2004). The 
generally applied strategy is to include covariates that are highly correlated with treatment indicators 
and/or the outcome variable – as we did in the baseline models specified above. To test the 
sensitivity of our baseline results we additionally estimate the ATEs using alternative sets of 
covariates and model specifications. The estimated ATEs using these alternative specifications (table 
9) are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the estimates in the baseline models – which is 
an indication that the results are robust to the choice of covariates.       
 
  5.6. Summary    
In summary, the results from the econometric analysis are found to be robust to different 
estimation techniques and alternative model specifications. The findings imply that (a) participation 
in high-standards agricultural trade results in significantly higher rural incomes; (b) this income 
effect is larger for contract farmers than for estate farm workers; (c) participation in contract farming 
is biased towards the relatively larger farms among the smallholders while participation in estate 
employment is not. In the next section we examine how these findings translate into poverty effects.  
  186. Simulation of poverty and inequality effects 
To assess the poverty effects, we simulate household income for two alternative scenarios and 
compare the outcomes with the actual income situation. For the first scenario (“No Exports”) both 
participation variables W1 and W2 are set to zero for all households in the sample, which simulates a 
situation in which there would be no exports of French beans at all. The second scenario 
(“Contract”) corresponds to the case where French bean exports would have been mainly realized 
through contract farming – as was the case till 2000 before increasing standards induced a shift from 
smallholder contract farming to large-scale estate farming. For this scenario participation in contract 
farming W2 is set as if none of the farmers who had a contract in 2000 lost their contract in the 
period 2000-2005. For these two scenarios we simulate household income based on the results of the 
baseline propensity score matching estimator (model III), calculate per capita incomes and derive 
poverty indicators.  
The results are striking (figure 6). First, the incidence of poverty in the research area is 
estimated to be 14 % points lower due to high-standards vegetable exports. Without the possibility 
for rural households to participate in high-standards export production (No Export scenario), the 
incidence of poverty in the region would be 56 % – similar to the average rural poverty rate for 
Senegal – while the actual poverty rate is only 42 %. Moreover, the incidence of extreme poverty 
would be three times higher: an estimated 35 % in the No Export scenario compared to 12 % in the 
actual situation. These are very large and important effects.  
Second, we find that per capita incomes do not differ much between the Contract scenario 
(0.44 million FCFA) and the actual situation (0.41 million FCFA) while they are much lower in the 
No Export scenario (0.26 million FCFA). Also poverty rates are not significantly different in the 
actual situation compared to the scenario Contract (figure 6). However, the incidence of extreme 
poverty is much lower in the actual situation – 12 % compared to 21% in the Contract scenario 
(figure 6). Hence the results imply that the high-standards FFV trade has a beneficial impact even if 
it is realized through large-scale estate farming. In fact, by creating employment opportunities that 
are relatively more accessible for the smallest farmers, FFV estate farming contributes even more to 
the alleviation of (extreme) poverty.     
  19These findings demonstrate that high-standards agricultural production and trade can 
directly reduce poverty and improve welfare even if it is realized through large-scale agro-industrial 
production. This challenges the general view in the literature of increasing food standards and agro-
industrialization leading to a concentration of the gains from trade with large food companies and to 
the marginalization of the smallest farmers and the poorest households.     
 
7. Conclusion   
The impact of trade on poverty remains the subject of considerable controversy, reinforced by recent 
studies on the growing importance of public and private standards in trade. This paper has analyzed 
these effects using micro-data from Senegal. FFV exports from Senegal to the EU grew sharply over 
the past decade despite increasing standards in EU markets. The response of FFV exporting 
companies to these increased standards has resulted in consolidation and increased vertical 
coordination at different levels of the supply chain. Part of the institutional response has been a shift 
away from smallholder contract-based farming towards large-scale agro-industrial production. Based 
on conventional arguments in the literature, one could expect these developments to be particularly 
bad for the smallest farmers and the poorest households.  
However, our analysis in this paper shows that this is not the case. We find that more and 
poorer households participate in and share in the gains from high-standards FFV export production. 
Supply chain restructuring has altered the mechanism through which local households benefit – 
increasingly through labor markets rather than through product markets – and thereby improved the 
distribution of gains within rural communities.  
We find highly significant and large effects on income and poverty, which demonstrate that 
rural households involved in high-standards export supply chains, either through contract farming or 
as workers on estates, do share importantly in the gains from export. This is a key empirical finding 
as it has repeatedly been argued in the literature that the gains from international trade and the rents 
in high-standards supply chains are captured by foreign investors and large agro-food companies 
while small farmers and poor households are marginalized. Especially contract farming has often 
been criticized as a tool for agro-industrial firms and multinationals to exploit unequal power 
relationships vis-à-vis farmers and extract rents from the supply chain.  
  20Furthermore, our results demonstrate that high-standards agricultural trade benefits rural 
incomes and reduces poverty even if the export industry is consolidating and even if export 
production is realized on industrial estate farms. In fact, we find that this model has the strongest 
positive effects on poverty reduction. The findings challenge the implicit assumption underlying 
many empirical studies that high-standards food production and trade needs to integrate farm 
households as primary producers in the supply chain if it is to benefit rural incomes. We show that 
also households involved as wage workers reap significant benefits from high-standards trade.  
The insight from this study that poorer households benefit from agricultural export 
development through the labor market rather then through product markets – has so far been 
neglected in the empirical literature on trade, standards and modern supply chains. We could draw 
the analogy with insights from the Green Revolution of the 1960s – that triggered major productivity 
growth and rural income rises in South-East Asian countries. The Green Revolution was at first 
believed to benefit richer farmers while marginalizing poorer farmers because of the specific 
constraints they face in accessing and using Green Revolution inputs. However, David and Otsuka 
(1994) were the first to document that poorer households did benefit from this technology-driven 
agricultural development because of labor market effects. The same might hold for standards-driven 
(or supply chain-driven) agricultural development.  
  Another important finding from this study is that high-standards agricultural export 
development in poor African countries is possible, despite the many constraints. This case-study on 
Senegalese FFV exports could add to the existing evidence of high-standards export development in 
Sub Sahara Africa (e.g. in Kenya, South-Africa, etc) and thereby shift the balance from viewing 
standards as barriers to trade to the standards-as-catalysts view – put forward by Jaffee and Henson 
(2005). In analogy with the technology-driven developments in South East Asia in the 1960s, there 
might be scope for standards-driven agricultural development – in which Sub Sahara Africa and its 
poor are not left behind.    
  21Appendix 
 
Table A.1.  Results of structural regression model I  (Regression on covariates) 
Linearized
Std. Err.
W1 (FFV estate employment)  2.269 1.014 2.24
W2 (FFV contract farming)  4.253 1.324 3.21
W1*W2 -2.801 2.208 -1.27
LAND 0.060 0.072 0.82
LABOR 0.469 0.150 3.13
AGE -0.270 0.211 -1.28
AGE
2 0.001 0.002 0.85
D-RATIO -0.822 1.928 -0.43
EDUCATION 2.070 1.584 1.31
ETHNICITY  0.230 0.635 0.36
UNION -0.813 0.851 -0.96
VILLAGE1  -0.270 1.028 -0.26
VILLAGE2 -0.685 1.157 -0.59
VILLAGE3 -1.950 1.541 -1.27
VILLAGE4 -1.317 1.440 -0.91
VILLAGE5 11.306 5.621 2.01
VILLAGE6 -0.196 1.259 -0.16
VILLAGE7 -0.757 1.306 -0.58
VILLAGE8 7.470 4.396 1.70
VILLAGE9 -2.078 1.693 -1.23
VILLAGE10 0.014 0.944 0.02
VILLAGE11 -2.137 1.495 -1.43
VILLAGE12 -2.635 1.298 -2.03
VILLAGE13 -0.465 1.134 -0.41
VILLAGE14 -0.307 1.275 -0.24
VILLAGE15 -0.383 1.070 -0.36
VILLAGE16 -0.096 1.351 -0.07
VILLAGE17 1.002 1.944 0.52
VILLAGE18 2.802 1.493 1.88
VILLAGE19 -1.292 2.172 -0.59
VILLAGE20 -1.809 1.391 -1.30
VILLAGE22 1.005 1.380 0.73
VILLAGE23 -1.883 1.432 -1.32




Table A.2.  Results of structural regression model II (Regression on propensity scores) 
Bootstrap
Std. Err.
W1 (FFV estate employment)  1.931 0.966 1.59
W2 (FFV contract farming)  4.650 1.759 2.78
W1*W2 -2.729 2.221 -1.04
PS_W1 8.750 5.820 1.33
PS_W2 6.255 13.55 0.50
PS_W1W2 -13.04 24.52 -0.54
CONSTANT -0.270 1.215 -0.20
t Coefficient Covariates
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Soleil Vert 800 1,100 2000 80%
Sepam 883 1,410 1992 0
Master 68 0 1989 0
Baniang 80 150 1999 51%
Agriconcept 100 80 2002 0
ANS Interexport 64 0 2001 0
Pasen 30 0 2000 0
Agral Export 180 0 1992 0
PDG 173 239 1993 0
1 FB: French beans; 
2 FFV: fresh and processed fruits and vegetables
Company name







Table 2.   Changing procurement of selected horticulture exporting companies 
1




1  100 20
Sepam ONAPES 100 60
Master ONAPES  50 40
Baniang ONAPES 85 85
Agriconcept SEPAS
2 30 30
ANS Interexport SEPAS 100 100
Pasen SEPAS 100 60
Agral Export SEPAS 100 100
PDG SEPAS 100 100
% of supply from smallholder 
contract-farming
1 ONAPES – Organisation National des Producteurs Exportateurs  de 
Fruits et Légumes de Sénégal







  27Table 3.   Household characteristics: averages across contract farmers, estate employees and 





Number of households in the sample  300 158 109 59
HUMAN CAPITAL
Age of the household head 54 53 56 53
Number of laborers 6.9 6.4 7.7 7.7
Dependency ratio  0.568 0.571 0.566 0.527
Female headed households  3.0% 3.3% 2.8% 0%
Household head with primary education 17.6% 16.5% 18.8% 19.4%
PHYSICAL CAPITAL
Farm size (ha) 5.03 4.92 5.05 6.82
Per capita
1 landholdings (ha) 0.83 0.84 0.78 1.03
Units
2 of livestock 2.64 2.87 1.84 4.14
Value of non-land assets (1,000 FCFA) 270.7 320.9 176.9 308.8
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Ethnicity (non Oulof)
3 27% 31% 17% 32%
Membership of a farmer's organisation  58% 54% 62% 77%
LOCATION
Dakar region  50% 42% 60% 67%
1 Per capita landholdings are calculated using the modified OECD adult equivalence scales
2 One livestock unit equals 1 cow, 0.8 donkey and 0.2 sheep/goat
3 Oulof are the majority ethnicity group in Senegal. 




in FFV export 
production 





Table 4.   Observable covariates for selection bias adjustment 










LAND Household landholdings in 1995
1 4.24   0.121** 0.056    0.162***
LABOR Household labor endowments  6.9    0.219***    0.202***   0.143**
AGE Age of the household head  54 -0.084  0.109* -0.014
D-RATIO Dependency ratio 0.57 0.005 -0.023  -0.100*
Dummy variables 
EDUCATION Hh head with primary education  0.18  0.106* -0.057 0.033
ETHNICITY  Non-oulof household  0.27 -0.092    -0.171*** 0.027
UNION Membership of farmers' union in 1995
1 0.31 0.022   -0.125**  0.097*
REGION Dakar region  0.50 -0.009   0.143** 0.053
VILLAGE1 - 23 Village dummies lowest corr. -0.076    -0.162***  -0.109* 
highest corr.   0.400***   0.161***    0.361***
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
1 Data for 1995 are based on recall data





  28Table 5.   Propensity score estimating using a bivariate probit model  
Robust Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err.
LAND   0.014  . 0.020   0.036 ** 0.017
LABOR   0.353 *** 0.123   0.050 ** 0.025
LABOR
2  -0.017 ** 0.008
ETHNICITY   -0.453 ** 0.183
UNION  -0.570 *** 0.189
REGION   0.491 *** 0.174   0.584 *** 0.175
CONSTANT  -1.908 *** 0.480  -2.151 *** 0.257
rho 0.112 0.106
Wald test rho=0:   χ2(1) = 1.096;   Prob > χ2 = 0.296




W1:  W2: 




Table 6.   Estimated treatment effects using regression, matching and propensity score 






MODEL I: Regression on covariates   2.27**    4.25***
(1.014) (1.324)
MODEL II: Regression on propensity scores
1  1.93**    4.65***
(0.966) (1.759)
MODEL III: Matching on propensity scores
1   1.90**    4.01***
(0.928) (1.074)
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
(numbers) are standards errors,





  29Table 7.   Simulation-based sensitivity analysis for propensity score matching estimators
1   
Treatment W1: FFV estate employment 
Baseline propensity score matching estimator (MODEL III) 1.897
Matching estimators with simulated binary confounder: 
Neutral confounder  1.884 2.118 1.048
Confounder calibrated to mimic ETHNICITY 1.953 1.256 0.458
Confounder calibrated to mimic UNION 1.925 1.084 0.465
Confounder calibrated to mimic REGION 1.975 1.954 2.167
Treatment W2: FFV contract farming 
Baseline propensity score matching estimator (MODEL III) 4.265
Matching estimators with simulated binary confounder 
Neutral confounder  4.654 1.796 1.087











1 The method is described by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) and builds on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and Rosenbaum (1987). It is supposed that the conditional independence assumption is not satisfied but that it 
would be satisfied if an additional binary variable could be observed. The method simulates this binary 
confounder in the data that is used as an additional matching factor. A comparison of the estimates obtained 
with and without matching on the simulated confounder informs to what extent the estimator is robust to this 
specific source of failure of the conditional independence assumption (Ichino et al., 2006).  
2 The outcome effect measures the estimated effect of the simulated binary confounder on the outcome variable 
– household income. 
3 The selection effect measures the estimated effect of the simulated binary confounder on the selection into 




Table 8.   Balancing properties of covariates in treated and control groups 
t Prob.> |t|
Treatment W1: FFV estate employment 
LAND Unmatched 3.765 3.676 2 0.15 0.883
Matched 3.858 3.932 -1.7 17.2 -0.10 0.924
LABOR Unmatched 7.482 6.153 43.5 3.18 0.002
Matched 7.432 6.940 16.1 63.0 1.07 0.288
LABOR
2 Unmatched 64.687 47.631 35.6 2.62 0.009
Matched 64.049 56.651 15.4 56.6 1.00 0.320
ETHNICITY  Unmatched 0.181 0.331 -34.9 -2.49 0.013
Matched 0.185 0.181 1 97.0 0.07 0.942
UNION Unmatched 0.181 0.338 -36.2 -2.59 0.010
Matched 0.185 0.133 12.2 66.4 0.92 0.359
REGION Unmatched 0.663 0.497 33.9 2.48 0.014
Matched 0.654 0.699 -9.1 73.2 -0.61 0.545
Treatment W2: FFV contract farming 
LAND Unmatched 5.662 3.676 38.1 2.60 0.010
Matched 5.481 5.868 -7.4 80.5 -0.34 0.733
LABOR Unmatched 7.759 6.153 50.7 3.31 0.001
Matched 7.632 6.877 23.8 53.0 1.28 0.202
REGION Unmatched 0.621 0.497 25 1.62 0.107
Matched 0.614 0.684 -14.2 43.3 -0.78 0.437
Sample Covariate





















Regression on covariates 
Baseline specification (MODEL I) 2.27 ** 4.25 ***
(1.014) (1.324)
Specification A 2.47 ** 5.23***
(1.079) (1.433)
Regression on the propensity score
1 
Baseline specification (MODEL II) 1.93 ** 4.65 ***
(0.966) (1.759)
Specification B 1.94 ** 4.49 ***
(0.980) (1.811)
Specification C 2.15 ** 4.52 **
(0.901) (1.934)
Specification D 2.10 ** 4.38 ***
(1.066) (1.810)
Matching on the propensity score
1
Baseline specification (MODEL III) 1.90** 4.01***
(0.928) (1.074)
Specification B 1.85 ** 4.37 ***
(0.969) (1.174)
Specification C 2.27 *** 4.16 ***
(0.930) (1.228)




legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
(numbers) are standards errors, 
1 standard errors are bootstrapped 
Specification A: right-hand side variables include next to the two treatment variables and the vector of 
covariates X as in the baseline model I, the interaction terms between the demeaned covariates and the 
treatment variables:  
Specification B:  propensity scores are estimated with a bivariate probit model including covariates that are 
correlated at the 1% significance level with the specific treatment variable and/or the outcome variable 
(household income). X = LAND, LABOUR, LABOUR
2, ETHNICITY. 
Specification C: propensity scores are estimated with a bivariate probit model including village dummies and 
covariates that are correlated at the 1% significance level with the specific treatment variable and/or the 
outcome variable (household income). X = LAND, LABOUR, LABOUR
2, ETHNICITY, VILLAGE1-23 
Specification D: propensity scores are estimated with a bivariate probit model including covariates that are 
correlated at the 10% significance level with the specific treatment variable and/or the outcome variable 
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horticulture products French beans
 
Source: data from DH – Direction de l’Horticulture (2005) 
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Source: map from Atlas du Sénégal – IRD – Cartographie A. LE FUR -AFDEC 











































contract farmers estate employees Total participants
 
The figure is based on recall data collected in 2005. To account for demographic effects, 
households for which the household head did not reach the age of 25 in a particular year 
and households who migrated to the area after a particular year are not taken into 
account for the figures of that year.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Household income from different sources: averages across contract farmers, estate 





















































Total household income Income from farming
Income from agr. wages Income from non-agr. sources
 
 
  33Figure 5.   The incidence of poverty and extreme poverty across contract farmers, estate 







































Incidence of poverty Incidence of extreme poverty
 
National rural poverty lines are used – constructed using data from the ESAM I and II 
surveys conducted in 1994 and 2002 (République du Sénégal, 2004) and adapted for 
changes in consumer price indices (African Development Bank, 2006), resulting in 
poverty lines 143,080 FCFA/year/adult equivalent for poverty and 31,812 
FCFA/year/adult equivalent for extreme poverty. Poverty indicators are derived from 
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  34Figure 6.    Distribution of propensity scores over control and treated units  
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